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BIANNUAL SURVEY
The cases discussed herein are those deemed to be of the most
importance in the procedural area. Many other cases would be
included, but limitations of space prevent the treatment of those
less important but, nevertheless, significant cases. Few cases treated
in the Survey are exhaustively discussed. It is hoped, however,
that the Survey accomplishes its basic purpose, viz., to key the
practitioner to significant developments in the procedural law of
New York.
The Table of Contents is designed to key the reader to those
specific areas of procedural law which may be of importance to
him. The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically
treated in the cases are listed under their respective articles.
ARTICLE 2 - LImITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 203(e): Relation back to commencement of personal injury
action allowed where executor enlarges original action to
include a claim for wrongful death.
In New York, once a personal injury action has been com-
menced, an executor may enlarge that suit to include a claim for
wrongful death upon the decease of the original plaintiff., In
Ringle v. Bass,2 the court allowed such an enlargement even though
the wrongful death action was not asserted until after the two-
year statute of limitations had expired.3 The court based its decision
on a combined interpretation of CPLR 203(e) and Decedent
Estate Law Section 120. CPLR 203(e) permits an amendment
to a complaint to assert a new claim as long as the original pleadings
gave "notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of trans-
actions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended
pleading." 4 Furthermore, Decedent Estate Law Section 120 permits
the enlargement of the complaint by the executor to include a
claim for wrongful death. The court, in reading these sections
together, concluded that since the new claim is based on occurrences
stated in the original pleadings and that since the executor has
the power to enlarge the action, then the wrongful ,death cause of
action must relate back to the commencement of the original action.5
Thus, this result effectively avoided the bar of the statute of
limitations.
CPLR 203(e) was an adaptation of Rule 15(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which has been interpreted by the federal
I N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAW § 120.
2 46 Misc. 2d 896, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1965).
3 N.Y. DE=C. EsT. LAw § 130.
4 CPLR 203 (e).
r See 1 WEI sTmET, Kom & Mn.Lm, Nmv YoRK Cnvn. PRAcric
1 203.29 (1965).
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courts to include such a theory.6 Furthermore, it cannot be con-
tended that this relation back, although a device for avoiding the
statute of limitations, does not produce a beneficial result, especially
when viewed in light of the notice to the defendant in the original
pleadings of the facts upon which the wrongful death action is based.
Since the defendant must have been apprised of the occurrences
upon which the new cause of action is based, the mere addition
of a new legal theory for recovery cannot prejudice him and, there-
fore, the wrongful death action should be allowed to relate back
to the commencement of the original personal injury action.
However, there is still another issue that must be discussed in
relation to the disposition of this case. CPLR 218(a) provides that
"nothing in this article shall authorize any action to be commenced
which is barred when this article becomes effective. . . ." In the
principal case decedent's death occurred on December 5, 1960.
The statute of limitations for wrongful death expired on December
5, 1962, prior to the effective date of the CPLR. At first glance,
the relation back theory as applied by this court falls squarely
within the limits of this provision, thereby precluding the relief
afforded by this case. It should be noted that this section was
apparently not called to the attention of this court, so that judicial
reflection on this point is not available.
This section, however, is amenable to conflicting interpretations,
one possibly consistent with this case. Primarily the statute deals
with an "action to be commenced" and since the executor merely
sought to enlarge an already pending action it could be argued
that no new action was commenced within the strict wording of the
statute.
Contrariwise, it is apparent that no initial action for wrongful
death could have been commenced, indicating that plaintiff should
not be able to circumvent the purpose of the statute, i.e., to prevent
the commencement of any cause of action which is barred at the
effective date of the CPLR. Wrongful death is obviously a separate
cause of action and it appears that the purpose of CPLR 218(a)
was to bar just such an enlargement as perfected here, although
it was not technically the commencement of an action.
General Municipal Law Section 50-e.: Motion to file late notice of
claim denied where city's ownership of property not discovered
by usual search.
In Thomson v. City of New York,1 the plaintiff sought per-
mission to file a late notice of claim. The plaintiff contended that
6Beach v. Grollman, 169 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Denver & Rio
Grande W.R.R. v. Clint 235 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1956); 3 Mooaz, FEDERAL
PRAcTICE § 15.15 (1964).
724 App. Div. 2d 4?7, 260 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1st Dep't 1965).
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